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NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF SAFETY REGULATION AS
NEGLIGENCE PER SE: THE PERISHABLE SANCTION
An inexperienced swimmer rents a boat which does not contain
a life preserver as required by a boating-safety regulation. He rows
to the middle of a lake and drowns when the boat overturns. In an
action brought by the administrator of his estate, where does liability
lie? We shall explore the law of negligence sufficiently far to examine
the consequences, in a negligence action in Kentucky, of the violation
by a defendant of an administrative regulation. The policy con-
siderations surrounding and the current law controlling the effect on
such negligent action by a plaintiff's contributory negligence will also
be treated, and it will be seen how, under the rules of our law, the
sanctions attached to the violation of a safety regulation are rendered
nugatory.
Violation and Defenses
In Kentucky, the violation of a valid, properly promulgated' ad-
ministrative regulation, like the violation of a statute or an ordinance,
is, under four conditions, considered negligence per se.2 The four
conditions are that: 1) the regulation must have been promulgated
for safety purposes; 2) the injury must be one the regulation was
promulgated to prevent; 3) the injury must be to a member of the
group protected; and 4) the violation must be the proximate cause
of the injury.3 The denomination of an act or omission as negligence
per se attaches to it no greater significance than that attached to
ordinary negligence. 4 Thus, to both are available the same defenses:
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and proximate cause.5
1Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 13.080-13.105 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS]
provide for the promulgation of administrative regulations, prescribe the pro-
cedures through which they are validated, and establish the conditions under
which they may be judicially noticed. See Akers, The 1952 State Agency Law, 41
Ky. LJ. 13 (1952).
2 Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ky. 1966). See Com-
ment, Violation of an Administrative Regulation as Negligence Per Se, 55 Ky. L.J.
886 (1967).
3 See Comment, Violation of an Administrative Regulation as Negligence Per
Se, supra note 2, at 887.
4 See Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute, 32
MnqN. L. REv. 105, 111-12 (1948). Dean Prosser states that "negligence per se
refers to the rule. .. that the declaration of a standard of conduct by the legislature
removes it from any determination by the jury, and that if the statute is violated,
negligence must be found without argument, as a matter of law ... In short, such
'negligence per se' is merely ordinary negligence....
5 Id. at 111, wherein it is stated that:
"Negligence per se" is not liability per se, and even though the viola-
(Continued on next page)
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The defense of assumption of risk has been abolished in Kentucky.8
The Court of Appeals held, in Parker v. ReddenT that where an injury
occurs as a result of plaintiff's action when encountering defendant's
negligence, the relevant issue is not whether plaintiff assumed the risk,
but whether plaintiff acted reasonably.8 The inquiry, then, in all cases,
is whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent.9 Contributory negli-
gence, like ordinary negligence, is the failure to exercise the degree of
care a prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circum-
stances.'0 For the negligence of plaintiff to be contributory, it need
not be the proximate cause of the accident complained of;" it is suf-
ficient if it contributed in any way or in any degree directly to the
injury.12 A finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent com-
pletely bars his recovery.13 Although the question of contributory
negligence is ordinarily one for the jury, when the proof is such that
reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion, the question is one of
law for the court to decide.
14
Where a defendant's violation of a statute or regulation is deemed
negligent per se, the defense of contributory negligence cannot be
maintained if the statute or regulation was designed to protect a
class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care15
and to place the entire responsibility of any violation-related injury
upon the defendant.16 Examples of such enactments are child labor
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tion is "conclusive evidence" of negligence and a peremptory instruction
must be given on that issue, there remain in the case all of the other
issues, such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and proximate
cause....
o Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 593.9Though gallons of ink have been expended in efforts to distinguish assump-
tion of risk from contributory negligence, it may be said simply that assumption of
risk is based on a subjective standard, requiring knowledge of the danger on the
part of the plaintiff, while contributory negligence is based on an objective standard,
requiring of plaintiff that conduct demanded of a reasonable man. See Parker
v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. 1967). See also Comment, 23 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 91 (1966).
10 Post v. American Clean. Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky. 1969).
"1 Acres v. Hall's Adm'r, 253 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1952); Louisve & N. Ry. v.
Hyde, 239 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1951).
12 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 129 (1966).
13Archer v. Bourne, 300 S.W. 604 (Ky. 1927); Straight Creek Fuel Co. v.
Mullins, 225 S.W. 726 (Ky. 1920).4 oetz v. Green River K •
Winn-Dixie Louisville, Inc. v. Smith, 372 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1963); Peerless Mfg.
Corp. v. Davenport, 136 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1940); Archer v. Bourne, 300 S.W. 604
(Ky. 1927); Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Mullins, 225 S.W. 726 (Ky. 1920).
'15 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 130 (1966); Skarpness v. Port of Seattle, 326 P.2d
747, 749 (Wash. 1958).
1oW. PnossEr, LAw OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PRossER]; Skarpness v. Port of Seattle, 326 P.2d 747, 749 (Wash. 1958).
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laws,17 the Federal Employer's Liability Act,18 and the Kentucky
statute19 abrogating a railroad employee's contributory negligence as a
defense to an action for injury or death contributed to by the railroad's
violation of a state or federal safety statute.20 A statute or regulation
may also be designed to relieve those who are fully capable of pro-
tecting themselves from the burden of doing so.21 Such an interpreta-
tion is likely to be given a statute or regulation only where the intent
of the legislative or administrative body involved is clear.22
Proximate Cause
A central issue to be resolved before a defendant may be held liable
in negligence for violation of a regulation is whether the plaintiff's
negligent conduct intervened in the production of the injury to the
extent that it may be said that the defendant's violation of the regula-
tion was not the proximate cause 23 of the plaintiff's injury.24
The Kentucky rule is that the proximate cause of an injury is that
factor which, in continuous and natural sequence, and without the
intervention of an independent responsible cause, induced the in-
jury,25 and without which the injury would not have occurred.2 6 The
question of what constitutes proximate cause is ordinarily for the
jury to determine, but where the uncontradicted evidence is such
that only one conclusion may be drawn therefrom, the court may
17 Beauchamp v. Sturges Burns Mfg. Co., 231 U.S. 320 (1914); Blanton v.
Kellioka Coal Co., 232 S.W. 614 (Ky. 1921); See 39 YALE L.J. 908 (1930).
18 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
29 KRS § 277.320.
2o KRS § 277.320 further provides that even where a safety statute is not
violated by the employer-railroad, the employee's contributory negligence shall not
bar recovery but-in comparative negligence fashion-merely diminish recovery in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee.
21 REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Tors § 483, comment c (1965). Stat-
utes requiring railways to fence their tracks for the protection of
livestock may be found to be intended to relieve adjoining landowners of
the necessity of... restraining their own cattle, even if they do not lack
the ability to do so.2 2 Baldwin v. Washington Motor Coach Co., 82 P.2d 131 (Wash. 1938);
PRossER § 36. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky relies largely on the language of
the statute or regulation, conditions and circumstances extant at the time of its
creation, and the evil it was intended to remedy, in determining the intent of the
legislative or administrative body. J. B. Blanton Co. v. Lowe, 415 S.W.2d 376, 378
(Ky. 1967); Brown v. Hobblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Ky. 1956).
23 See PRossER § 42, at 244, wherein it is said:
The term proximate cause" is applied by courts to those more or less
undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact of
causation is clearly established.
24 Comment, Violation of an Administrative Regulation as Negligence Per Se,
supra note 2, at 888.
25 Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D. Ky. 1966); Morris
v. Combs' Adm'r, 200 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. 1947).26 Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D. Ky. 1966);
Gerebenics v. Gaillard, 338 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1960).
[Vol. 62.
COlMI',TS
determine proximate cause as a matter of law.27 In accordance with
the basic tort-law premise that the legal system ought to leave a loss
where it lies unless more good than harm would be accomplished by
shifting it,28 the question of whose act shall be deemed the proximate
cause of the injury is answered by the determination of who, as a
matter of policy, should bear the loss incurred by the plaintiff.29
A Policy Conflict and Its Resolution
Where a defendant's violation of a regulation promulgated in the
interest of the safety of the plaintiff and his class concurs with the
plaintiff's conduct in the production of the injury, the stage is set for
the resolution of two somewhat conflicting policy considerations re-
garding the apportionment of the loss. In such a situation, the court
is confronted on the one hand with the need to protect the plaintiff
and his class by securing adherence to regulated standards promul-
gated to promote their safety. The attachment of liability for negli-
gence to a defendant whose conduct violated the safety regulation ap-
pears to be a sanction sufficient to achieve this goal. Contradistinctly,
sanctions intended to protect A by discouraging negligent, dangerous
conduct by B must not be made counter-productive by encouraging
negligent, unreasonable, or unsafe behavior by A, secure in the knowl-
edge that his conduct is insulated by B's prior violation of a regula-
tion,30 so that, regardless of his own acts, the burden of loss from his
injury will be shifted to B. By way of dictum in a recent opinion,31
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky indicated its predilection regarding
this policy resolution which is inherent in the disposition of an action
based on the violation of an administrative regulation as negligence
per se and defended on the ground of contributory negligence.32
In Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. Berry,33 plaintiff's decedent
2
7 Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D. Ky. 1966); Jewell
v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955).2 8 Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. BEtv. 122,
151 (1961).
20 Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 kr... L. REv. 582, 606 (1935).
The judge's function in the determination of duty owed plaintiff by de-
fendant is extremely important.. .. How does the judge know the limits of
governmental protection-for it is limits he is called up~on to set. Here
many factors come into play. For lack of better terminology, let us name
them administrative policy moral policy, economic policy, preventive
policy, and the all-comprehensive justice" policy. It is these policies
courts have ordinarily dealt with under "proximate cause".
30 Keeton, supra note 28, at 151:
In this situation, in counterweight to the utility of the tort cause of action
as a deterrent to conduct like the defendant's is the disutility of its en-
couragement of conduct like the plaintiff's.
31 Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. Berry, 487 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1972).
32 Id. at 953.
s3 Id. at 951.
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son, an adult lacking experience as a swimmer, rented a canoe from
the defendant, Christian Appalachian Project, at the latter's recreation
center and, without a life preserver, paddled to the middle of the lake
where he drowned when the canoe overturned. The elder Berry, in a
wrongful death action, argued that the Project had failed to provide
young Berry's canoe with a life preserver as required by a boating-
safety regulation 34 issued by the Kentucky Department of Public
Safety,35 and that the violation of the regulation constituted negligence
per se, rendering the project liable.3 6 Through disclaiming the ability
to take judicial notice of the regulation because of its improper promul-
gation,3 7 the Court, in reversing a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff,
said that even if the regulation had been valid and effective, so that
defendant's violation of the standard could be denominated negligence
per se, plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery under the Kentucky
Wrongful Death Statute38 since the conduct of decedent, an adult,
inexperienced swimmer, in encountering what should have been an
obvious risk by renting a canoe and paddling to the middle of the lake
without a life preserver, was so unreasonable as to constitute con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law and bar recovery 3 9
Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts4" and Dean Prosser,41
the Court said that contributory negligence may consist not only of
the failure to discover, appreciate, or contend with a risk in a manner
befitting a reasonable man, "but also in an intentional exposure to a
danger of which plaintiff was aware"42 and that
34 Kentucky Dep't of Pub. Safety, Boating Rule 17, 4 Ky. ADIM. REG. StoV.
(1972).
35 Under the reorganization of Kentucky state government, effected in 1973,
the Division of Boating was transferred to the Department of Transportation.
36 487 S.W.2d at 953.
37 KRS § 13.085(2) requires that each administrative regulation, to carry the
force of law, contain a reference to the statute authorizing its promulgation. KIRS
§ 235.250 authorized Boating Regulation 17. Boating Regulation 17 referred to
KRS § 325.250, however-an obvious typographical error. Therefore, Boating
Regulation 17 did not contain a reference to the statute which authorized it and
was invalid. The Court notes that the existence and provisions of the regulation
could have been established by pleading and proof, but it declines to take judicial
notice of the regulation, as it would otherwise have been authorized to do, in
the absence of proper promulgation. 487 S.W.2d at 953.
38 KRS § 411.130.
39 487 S.W.2d at 954.
[A]pplying the common experience of adults who choose to engage in
recreational activities involving the use of canoes, we must regard the
conduct of decedent in this case as manifestly unreasonable conduct in
encountering a danger that was obvious to any reasonable person under
the circumstances claimed to exist by the plaintiff's evidence.
4 0 
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 466 (1965).4 1 PROSSER § 65.
42 487 S.W.2d at 954. See PnossER § 35.
Vol. 62
COMMNTS
the reasonableness of the decedents conduct must be determined
by balancing the risk against the value which the law attaches to
the advantages he is seeking. Where the decedents conduct
clearly involves a risk all out of proportions to its value, such
conduct must be regarded as contributory negligence as a matter
of law.
43
The dictum suggests that any sanction to be attached to a de-
fendant's violation of a safety regulation is completely negated by
contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff (or, as here, in a
wrongful death action, decedent). Berry appears to be a "hard" case
which does not conflict with what may or may not be "bad" law in
Kentucky.4 4 One who voluntarily exposes himself to known or obvious
dangers or those which could be anticipated by one of ordinary
prudence is guilty of contributory negligence barring his recovery for
resulting injuries.45 No exception to this rule is provided for a plaintiff
whose contributory negligence follows a defendant's violation of an
ordinance, statute, or administrative regulation.46 In Durham v. Marat-
ta,47 although referring to the defendant's violation of an ordinance
as the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, the Court refused to
establish a standard of absolute liability, and provided that the jury
must still determine whether the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent.48 Similarly, in Brown Hotel v. Levitt,49 the Court recognized
the defense of an intervening force as proximate cause of the injury
to an allegation that violation of a statute was negligence per se, and
said that the plaintiffs contributory negligence could constitute the
intervening force.50 The Court held in Gregory v. Paducah Midstream
43 487 S.W.2d at 954. See REsTATEM Ew (SEco~N) oF TORTS § 466(a), com-
ment c (1965).44 While the sanction of complete bar to recovery for contributory negligence
may serve to discourage negligent behavior by a plaintiff, it does nothing to dis-
courage negligent behavior, or violation of a safety regulation, by a defendant. See
Keeton, supra note 28, at 151. Indeed, in view of the Berry dictum, those who
supply boats and canoes to the public in Kentucky appear free to violate with
impunity and without fear of retributon in tort the requirement that life pre-
serversbe provided in all craft, since the act of embarking upon the waters in a
vessel sans preserver is considered recovery-barring contributory negligence as a
matter of law. It is submitted that a system of comparative negligence, whereby
each negligent actor would bear a proportionate share of the loss, would better
serve to encourage both adherence to safety regulations and caution in the en-
counter of their breach. Any discussion of the implementation of such a systemis, of course, beyond the scope of this comment.
45 Peerless Mfg. Corp. v. Davenport, 136 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1940).
46 See Comment, Negligence Per Se as Proximate Cause of Injury in "Fall-
Down" Cases, 57 Ky. L.J. 277 (1967). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs
§ 483 (1965).
47 195 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1955).
48 Id. at 279.
49209 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1948).
5o Id. at 71.
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Service5' that defendant's violation of a Kentucky boating regulation
constituted negligence, but said that if, upon retrial, plaintiff's conduct
is found to have amounted to contributory negligence,52 plaintiff would
be barred from recovery as a matter of law.53
Foreseeability
The dictum in Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. Berry5 4 demon-
strates that in its effort to determine the proximate cause of, and thus
to fix the liability for and the burden of loss from, an injury, the Court
places greater emphasis upon the reasonableness of the conduct of a
plaintiff in responding to a risk created by a defendant, than upon
the foreseeability to the defendant that his act or omission would cause
injury to the plaintiff. Authorities 55 indicate that throughout the
history of the law of negligence, the notion of foreseeability has been
intertwined with the development of liability. 0 The factor of foresee-
ability has been held to be so important that it is not altered by a
negligent act of the plaintiff himself: 57
when I lent my car to a careless driver, one of the risks that made
me negligent was surely the chance that he might hurt himself.58
The Kentucky rule, laid down in Hines v. Westerfield,59 is that an
original negligent actor who set in motion a chain of events will not
be relieved of liability if his act led to an event which one, in view
of the experience of mankind, "might have reasonably foreseen."60 And
in Parker v. Redden,61 the Court held that
the original negligent actor is not relieved of liability by the sub-
sequent negligent acts of another if the subsequent acts might
reasonably have been foreseen.
62
From the facts in Berry,63 it is difficult to conceive how it could
reasonably be argued that the defendant could not have foreseen
51401 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1966).
52 Id. at 42.
5r3 Id. at 43.
54 487 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1972). See also notes 37-39 supra and accompanying
text.
55 2 W. HARPER & F. JAMiEs, LAw OF ToRTs 1134 (1964); PnossER § 43; See
Nunan v. Bennett, 212 S.W. 570 (Ky. 1919).
56 Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1401 (1961).
57 Nehbrass v. Home Indem. Co., 37 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. La. 1941).
58 Id. at 126.
59 254 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1953).
60 Id. at 729.
61421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
62 Id. at 595.
63 See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
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that the decedent would climb into the canoe and paddle off to the
middle of the lake where the absence of a life preserver could result
in his death if the boat overturned. To suggest unforeseeability is to
contend that the defendant, who provided the decedent with a canoe
for rent, could not expect that he would actually use it.
However, in Hines v. Westerfield" and Parker v. Redden,65 the
negligent acts subsequent to those of the original negligent actor were
performed by third persons, not by plaintiff. The determination of
which foreseeable occurrences should render a defendant liable, as
much as what constitutes the proximate cause of the injury,66 is a
question of policy subject to judicial determination.67 Accepted as
sound is the policy that even where the injury to the plaintiff was
foreseeable by the defendant, the plaintiff's act of unreasonably en-
countering the risk of injury contributes to the injury and thereby bars
his recovery.68 According to the Court, a defendant should not reason-
ably be expected to foresee what may be termed unreasonable acts of
another,69 and a plaintiff, upon encountering the negligence of a de-
fendant, is neither relieved of the duty to exercise ordinary care for
his own safety, nor licensed to walk blindly into dangers which are
obvious or known to him or which would be anticipated by a person
of ordinary prudence.
70
Conclusion
The foregoing constitutes an attempt to examine the Kentucky law
of negligence in order to determine the consequences of a defendant's
violation of a safety regulation as modified by conduct of a plaintiff
which is denominated contributory negligence. The dictum in Berry7'
is apparently reflective of the Court's determination that, as a matter
of policy, even where a defendant's violation of a safety regulation
can be characterized as risk-producing negligence, the conduct of a
plaintiff in unreasonably encountering that risk is sufficient to shelter
the violator from all liability, as if, in effect, the violation had never
been committed. This result is not at odds with the rule of long
standing that ond who voluntarily exposes himself to known or obvious
64254 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1953).
65 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
66 Green, supra note 29.
6 7 Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 543,
567 (1962).68 See, e.g., RESTATE :NT (SEcoND) or ToRTS § 524(2) (1965).
69 Spaulding v. Thacker, 415 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
70 Morton v. Allen Constr. Co., 416 S.W.2d 733 (Ky. 1967).
71 See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
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dangers or those which could be anticipated by one of ordinary
prudence is guilty of contributory negligence barring his recovery for
resulting injuries.12 Nevertheless, in contemplating the facility with
which the defendant's liability for negligence for violation of a safety
regulation was completely negated by an act of plaintiffs deceased
son, one might reasonably question the value and usefulness of a
sanction which is rendered inapplicable and inoperative by the occur-
rence of the very evil it was intended to prevent. In view of the Berry
dictum, those who supply boats and canoes to the public in Kentucky
appear free to violate with impunity and without fear of retribution in
tort the requirement that life preservers be provided in all craft, since
the act of embarking upon the waters sans preserver is considered
recovery-barring contributory negligence as a matter of law.
David Lemaster
72 Peerless Mfg. Corp. v. Davenport, 136 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1940).
